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PREFERENTIAL PROPERTY TAX TREATMENT OF FARM-
LAND AND OPEN SPACE UNDER MICHIGAN LAW
As thousands of acres are daily converted from open space or
farm use to more intensive uses,' Americans are slowly gaining an
appreciation of the finite nature of land resources. Among the prob-
lems created by continuing urban sprawl are loss of land available
for food production and loss of the aesthetic benefits derived from
having open spaces readily accessible to residents of the urban
area. 2
Often cited as a factor contributing to the high rate of conversion
to higher use is the ad valorem property tax. 3 As the city pushes
outward, land values on the fringe rise.4 Consequently, the land is
reassessed to reflect its new potential urban use. Simultaneously,
the outward push raises the demand for governmental services,
such as police and sanitation, and may thereby force tax rates
upward. 5 With both the tax base and the rate paid on that base
increased, the land owner's tax bill rises dramatically while income
from his low intensity use (farming is the most common example)
rises more slowly, if at all.
In response, the legislatures of more than half of the states have
acted to reduce the ad valorem property tax burden on farmers,
'See, e.g., estimates contained in OFFICE OF LAND USE, MICHIGAN DEPT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, WORKING PAPER, LAND TAXATION AND MICHIGAN 1 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as LAND TAXATION], and in CAL. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON
REVENUE AND TAXATION, TAXATION OF PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA, A MAJOR TAX
STUDY, part 5, at 207 (1964) [hereinafter cited as MAJOR TAX STUDY].
2See Henke, Preferential Property Tax Treatment for Farmland, 53 ORE. L. REV. 117,
118-119 (1974). For some of the socio-economic problems associated with urban sprawl, see
MAJOR TAX STUDY, supra note 1, at 209-14. See also Stocker, How Should We Tax
Farmland In the Rural-Urban Fringe?, 54 PROC. NAT. TAX ASSOC. 463 (1961).
3See, e.g., Henke, supra note 2, at 119. It is estimated that in Michigan in 1971, property
taxes levied on farm real estate amounted to 27.9 percent of net farm income. LAND
TAXATION, supra note 1, at 1.
I Land, Unraveling the Rurban Fringe: A Proposal for tile Implementation of Proposi-
tion Three, 19 HASTINGS L. J. 421, 428 (1968).
MAJOR TAX STUDY, supra note 1, at 205.
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and some states have included tax relief to the owners of open
space. 6 Michigan was added to the list with the passage of the
Farmland and Open Space Preservation Act of 1974.7 The com-
mon underlying theory appears to be that if rising costs, including
taxes, are a cause of the sale and conversion to more intensive use,
then lower taxes ought to reduce the rate of conversion.
Proposals for the preservation of farm land and open space are,
of course, not limited to granting preferences within the ad valorem
system. Other proposals (aside from public acquisition of the fee)
which have been widely considered, but are beyond the scope of
this note, include (1) land value taxation (encouraging the most
intensive development of small units of land and avoiding urban
sprawl by taxing only the value of the land and not the improve-
ments on it); (2) capital gains taxation 9 (deterring land speculation
by the near total taxation of certain real estate capital gains); (3)
development rights transfer ° (allowing owners in a zoned area to
trade the rights to make improvements); and (4) strengthening the
resistance to zoning changes. 1
Despite this proliferation of ideas, there is no firm consensus on
the ultimate wisdom of any governmental intervention to prevent
conversion of farmland and open spaces to more intensive uses.
Critics" and commentators line up on both sides of the controversy.
Those who favor some sort of government action argue: that rapid
destruction of the country's agricultural base is occurring; that ad
valorem property taxation is unfair to farmers and open space
6 A recent compilation is contained in Henke, supra note 2, at 117-118 n.1. A tax break is
often more palatable to voters and legislators than is a positive program of subsidy payments
even though both approaches have the identical effect of reducing funds available for other
projects and even though tax preferences are usually less precise in the selection of benefit
recipients than are positive payments programs. Stone, Tax Incentives as a Solution to
Urban Problems, 10 W. & M. L. REV. 647 (1969).
' MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.701-.719 (West's 1974 Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 2 at
265-75) [hereinafter cited without source].
' See Lindholm, Land Taxation and Economic Development, 41 LAND ECON. 121 (1965);
Smith, Land Value Versus Real Property Taxation: A Case Study Comparison, 46 LAND
ECON. 305 (1970).
9 See Barlowe, Ahl, and Bachman, Use Value Legislation in the United States, 49 LAND
ECON. 206, 212 (1973); Cooke & Power, PreferentialAssessment ofAgricultural Land, 47
FLA. B. J. 636, 641 (1973).
10 Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L. J. 75
(1973); Rose, A Proposal for the Separation and Marketability of Development Rights as a
Technique to Preserve Open Space, 51 J. URBAN LAW 461 (1974).
" See Note, The Dilemma of Preserving Open Space: How to Make Californians an
Offer They Can't Refuse, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 284, 300 (1972).
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property owners both in terms of ability to pay and in benefits
received; that the most profitable use is not necessarily the most
socially desirable use; and that rising taxes force the farmer off the
land before it is fully "ripened," causing the farmer to lose his
capital gain to a middleman speculator or causing the land to be
prematurely developed in other than the highest and best use.
12
Opponents of governmental "interference" argue: that subsidies
distort resource allocation, preserving ineffiency; 13 that it alters the
input mix of farming operations favoring the land-intensive over
labor- or machine-intensive farming; 14 and that it raises land prices
by removing a cost of land ownership, thereby creating a windfall
to landowners at taxpayer expense. 15 Other critics claim that pre-
serving certain lands simply forces developers to reach farther out,
"leapfrogging" the subsidized land, 16 that such skip development
creates a checkerboard pattern that raises the costs of city services
which now must traverse greater distances, 17 and that the checker-
board enclaves become even more inefficient because their ac-
tivities (e.g., crop dusting) must be curtailed in deference to nearby
populations. 18
This note will not attempt to resolve all of these opposing con-
tentions. Rather, assuming that a rational legislative choice has
been made, the note will attempt to explain the new Michigan
statute and evaluate the effectiveness of this type of legislation as a
means of preserving open space and farmland from conversion to
more intensive use.
I. THE NATURE OF PREFERENTIAL PROPERTY
TAX TREATMENT
While there are wide variations among the many preferential
treatment statutes enacted around the country, most fall into three
,2 See, e.g., Stocker, supra note 2.
3 Cooke & Power, supra note 9 at 639.
14 See Lockner & Kim, Circuit-Breakers on Farm-Property-Tax Overload: A Case
Study, 26 NAT'L. TAX J. 233, 238 (197"3).
' Cooke & Power, supra note 9, at 640.
,6 Fusfeld & Kowalski, Reforming the Michigan Property Tax, 49 MICH. ST. B. J. 13, 21
(1970).
'7 Note, supra note I1, at 296.
18 Alden & Shockro, Preferential Assessment of Agricultural Lands: Preservation or
Discrimination?, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 59, 68 (1969).
[VOL. 8:428
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broad, overlapping groups.19 Some states require the assessor to
disregard market value and assess the land at its value as used. 20
Others provide for deferred taxation by charging a lower-than-
normal rate while the land is used in an approved manner and
recapturing all or part of the reduction when the land is converted
to another use. 21 A third group provides tax benefits only when the
land has been subjected to an enforceable agreement between the
owner and the state whereby the use of the land is restricted. 22
Obviously a statute may adopt a combination of characteristics.
Many states, for example, combine use valuation with tax
deferral. 23
I. THE FARMLAND AND OPEN SPACE PRESERVATION
ACT OF 1974
A. Antecedents
Farmers and other large land owners have long promoted prop-
erty tax relief.24 Their success in many states in the past decade
appears to be the result of several recent trends, including: the
growth of local governmental activity, resulting in higher tax rates;
the decline of the local assessor's practice of undervaluing rural
land; 25 and the realization on the part of urban dwellers of the need
to preserve open space. 26
In Michigan, the earliest effort toward preferential treatment
appears to have been the proposal in 1965 of use-value
assessment.27 Since then, preferential treatment proposals have
regularly appeared in the legislature. Final passage of the current
law came in May, 1974.28
19 For a somewhat more detailed classification, see Barlowe, supra note 9. For a synopsis
of the content of each of the statutes, see Note, Property Taxation ofAgricultural and Open
Space Land, 8 HARV. J. LEGISLATION 158, 192 (1970) (Appendix). For a discussion of
constitutional requirements, see Hagman, Open Space Planning and Property Taxation
Some Suggestions, 1964 Wis. L. REV. 628, 640-45.
20 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.461 (Supp. 1973).
21 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.111, .112, .13 (Supp. 1973).
22 E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51230-51295 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. REV. AND TAX
CODE §§ 421-431 (West Supp. 1973).
23 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b) (Supp. 1973).
24 See Hagman, supra note 19, at 632.
25 W. WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE, 103-04 (1968). But see Fusfeld & Kowalski,
supra note 16, who argue that state equalization programs have failed and that underassess-
ment of rural land continues.
26 Hagman, supra note 19, at 636.
27 LAND TAXATION, supra note 1, Appendix B.
28 Approved by Governor Milliken as the Farmland and Open Space Preservation Act,
Public Act 116 of 1974, 77th Mich. Legis., Reg. Sess., on May 23, 1974.
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B. General Provisions of the Michigan Statute
The statute provides tax relief for owners of farmland and cer-
tain open space in return for entry into an agreement with the state
or local government restricting the right to develop the land for a
minimum period of ten years. Publicized as a combination of ag-
ricultural relief and environmental preservation,2 9 the statute is,
despite its open-space provisions, primarily of benefit to individu-
als and corporations presently engaged in active farming. As dis-
cussed below, the Farmland Agreement is the heart and bulk of the
statute. 30 In effect, three programs are created. 3 A Farmland De-
velopment Rights Agreement (hereinafter referred to as Farmland
Agreement) provides income tax credits to farmers who pay exces-
sive property taxes. 32 An owner of certain designated open space
lands may apply for a Designated Open Space Development
Rights Easement (hereinafter referred to as Designated Area
Easement) which entitles the owner to a property tax reduction
with the state reimbursing the locality for lost revenue. 33 Finally,
an owner of open space not within the designated categories may
apply to the local governing body for a Local Open Space De-
29 See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, May 8, 1974, at 3-A, col. 4.
30 The original estimates projected an annual $6-10 million cost for the Farmland Agree-
ment program and $100,000 for the Open Space program. MICH. HOUSE OF REP. BILL
ANALYSIS DIVISION, ANALYSIS - H. B. 4244 (7-17-74) at 2. Preceding enactment, revisions
favoring farmland were made that could raise the cost of the Farmland Agreement program
to $94 million annually. Detroit Free Press, May 8, 1974, at 3-A, col. 4.
31 The Act uses the word "agreement" in one program, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.705,
and the word "easement" in the other two, MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 554.706, .707. The use
of this wording was apparently meant only to separate the farmland program from the open
space program in order to ensure that the different application procedures and methods of
providing benefits would not be confused. In sections describing the effect of the restriction
entered into, the words agreement and easement are used interchangeably. See MICH.
Comp. LAWS §§ 554.703, .704, .708, .709, .711, .715. However, the definitions section
distinguishes agreements, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.702(4) ("the owner and the state ...
agree to hold jointly the right to develop"), from easements, MICH. Comp. LAWS §
554.702(5) ("the owner relinquishes to the public ... the right to develop"). If a court
interpreting the statute concludes that the Legislature was not making a substantive distinc-
tion but merely using different terms for convenience, it is unclear whether the court should
apply property or contract rules. What, for example, will be the effect of changed condi-
tions?
31 MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 554.705, .710. See notes 35-71 and accompanying text infra.
33 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.706. See notes 72-91 and accompanying text infra.
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velopment Rights Easement (hereinafter referred to as Local
Easement) which entitles the owner to a property tax reduction but
for which the locality is usually not reimbursed by the state.34
While there are significant differences in the three programs, there
is also substantial overlap. The section that follows illustrates the
general operation of the Act by describing the Farmland Agree-
ment, including the features common to the other programs. Later
sections of the note will focus on the aspects of the two types of
open space easements which distinguish them from the Farmland
Agreement.
1. The Farmland Agreement - Benefits are available to owners
of "farmland." While the definition of farmland is ambiguous in
several respects, 35 an operation devoted primarily to agricultural
use involving more than forty acres, or else more than five acres
with a gross annual income of more than $200 per acre, is generally
eligible farmland. 36
An owner who desires to enter a Farmland Agreement 37 begins
by filing an application with the local governing body. 38 The local
government notifies other interested governments and agencies
which then have thirty days to file comments and recom-
mendations. 39 The local government has forty-five days from re-
ceipt of the application to approve or reject it. 40 If approved, or if
34 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.707. See notes 92-112 and accompanying text infra. In the
case of land that qualifies under two or more of the programs, for example, grazing land that
is both farmland and open space, the statute contains no language prohibiting the owner
from electing the most advantageous program. For that matter, there is no prohibition
against entering more than one program simultaneously. Benefits are structured so that no
double subsidy is possible, but under varying circumstances, one program may be more
beneficial than the other, and entry to both would effectively permit choice of the superior
benefit in any given year.
11 "Farmland" includes "specialty farms," MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.702(6)(C), and
noncontiguous areas which are integrated parts of a farming operation, MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 554.702(6)(D). The State Land Use Agency - that is, the Office of Land Use in the
Department of Natural Resources, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.702(17) - is responsible for
promulgating rules and regulations for the implementation of the Act, MICH. Comp. LAWS
§ 554.717. The ultimate interpretation of the rule defining "Specialty Farms," Proposed
Rule 554.701(8), will shape the purposes to which the Act will be put. Thus, as more
intensive uses, such as feed lots or mushroom barns, are defined as eligible specialty farms,
the effect of the Act shifts toward simple subsidy of agricultural businesses and away from
preservation of open space.
36 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.702(6), Proposed Rule 554.721.
31 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.705.
31 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.705(1), Proposed Rule 554.731. The appropriate local gov-
erning body may be a city council, township board, or county board of commissioners,
depending upon the location of the land. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.702(7).
39 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.705(3), Proposed Rule 554.732(3).
'0 This decision is to be governed by rules promulgated by the State Land Use Agency,
MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 554.705(4), .717. These rules are contained in Proposed Rule
554.733(1).
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the owner wishes to appeal a rejection, the application is forwarded
to the State Land Use Agency (SLUA). If the application was
approved by the local governing body, the SLUA may reject it
only if the land does not satisfy the definition of farmland. 41 The
SLUA may override a local rejection. 42 If rejected by the SLUA,
the applicant may appeal under the Administrative Procedures
Act.
4 3
After approval, a Farmland Agreement is executed and
recorded.44 The Farmland Agreement is a restrictive covenant, for
a term of at least ten years, 45 running with the land, by which the
owner and the state jointly hold the right to develop the land.46 The
land so restricted may not have built upon it any structure or im-
provement except for use consistent with farm operations.47 The
owner may not sell any interest in the land except an easement
which does not substantially hinder farming operations (e.g., one
for access or for utilities). 48 The whole of the owner's interest in
the land may, however, be sold without penalty if the successor in
title complies with the terms of the Farmland Agreement.49 If the
owner or successor in title converts land covered by a Farmland
Agreement to a prohibited use or knowingly sells for a prohibited
use, he may be enjoined and is subject to civil liability for
damages. 50
41 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.705(7), Proposed Rule 554.733(2). Since the state pays for
the benefits conferred under a Farmland Agreement, see notes 5 1-61 and accompanying text
infra, this limitation effectively allows the locality to commit the state to substantial expen-
ditures. Moreover, since there is no cost to the locality, except for the exemption from
special assessments described in notes 60 and 61 and accompanying text infra, applications
will likely be routinely approved as a service to residents, and the Act will serve merely to
provide a subsidy to any interested farmer, without regard to open space values of the
subsidized land. The proposed rules do not limit the local government's ability to approve
applications beyond requiring that the broad defination of "farmland" be satisfied. Proposed
Rule 554.733(l).
42 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.705(6).
43 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.705(9). Appeal is pursuant to Public Act 306 of 1969, MICH.
CoMP. LAWS § 24.201 et seq.
44 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.705(8).
45 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.704(1).
46 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.702(4).
47 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.705(7)(a), (b).
48 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.705(7)(c). However, under MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.704,
the Farmland Agreement does not supersede any interest or lien previously recorded. Such
interests may be inconsistent with the purposes of the Farmland Agreement. For example,
the statute is silent about mineral rights which are often held by other than the possessor of
the surface. Apparently a locally approved Farmland Agreement must be granted by the
state even though someone has the right to come in at any time and begin mining operations.
See text accompanying note 41 supra.
49 MICH. ComP. LAWS § 554.711.
50 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.715.
[VOL. 8:428
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In return for accepting these restrictions, the owner may receive
a tax benefit from the state. Land approved for a Farmland Agree-
ment is assessed at its fair market value by the State Tax
Commission.51 The land is not exempted from local taxation.
Rather, the owner calculates the amount by which property tax on
land covered by the Farmland Agreement exceeds 7 percent of
household income5 2 (or taxable income in the case of corporate
owners 53) and receives a credit in that amount on his state income
tax liability. 54 If the credit exceeds state income tax liability, the
owner receives the difference in a payment from the state. 55 The
s' MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.705(7). This initial state assessment provides a base from
which the state can judge later whether the locality is yielding to the temptation to overas-
sess the land knowing that the state, not the owner, will pick up the tax bill. For a descrip-
tion of the benefit mechanism, see text accompanying notes 52-61 infra. The Act does not,
however, mention the possibility of state review and rollback of local assessments. It is
unclear whether such mechanisms could be adopted as part of the administrative rules. The
Proposed Rules, 554.737(2), do require the locality to inform the SLUA annually of the
current assessment.
52 MICH. COMP. LAWS §554.710(l)(a). "Household income" includes all income of all
members of the household. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.508(4). "Income" is roughly equi-
valent to gross income as defined by the Internal Revenue Code. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 61; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.510(1). The rationale behind the 7 percent figure is unclear.
Perhaps it is the level at which the tax burden becomes "excessive," but if excessive burden
is the concern, then considerations of income level or ability to pay may have been over-
looked. Moreover, all farms, even those in areas that will not be threatened with develop-
ment in the foreseeable future, are eligible. Although it is beyond the scope of this note, it
would be useful to analyze income and tax burdens in areas removed from development
pressures. Perhaps property taxes exceed 7 percent of household income even in the most
remote areas. In that event, preserving adequate supplies of farmland from conversion
would be of secondary import in a program of general subsidy to farmers.
This problem has arisen in other states as well. See, e.g., Note, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW.,
supra note 11, at 291, noting that much of the subsidized land in California is in no danger of
conversion. See Henke, supra note 2, at 124; Lockner & Kim, supra note 14.
13 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.710(l)(b). The corporate owner stands to benefit from the
Act even more than does the individual owner. Household income, MICH. COMP. LAWS §
206.508(4) (Supp. 1974), the base for the individual, includes income attributable to the
farmer's services in running the farm, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61, MICH COMP. LAWS §
(Supp. 1974). Corporate taxable income, MICH. COMP. LAWS 206.510(1) §§ 206.28,32
(Supp. 1974) does not include payments for services. For example, assume two farms, one
individually owned, the other incorporated, with identical operations and revenue, each
operated by a single farmer. The corporate farm may deduct its expenses, including the
salary paid to the resident farmer, in determining taxable income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 162,63. The individual farmer will have all of the same deductions except salary, since the
compensation from services he renders is income to him and is therefore included in house-
hold income. Consequently, although identical in all other respects, the base for determining
whether taxes exceed 7 percent is higher for the individual than for the corporation.
51 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.710.
55 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.710(3).
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calculation is based on the whole of household income, though
only part of an owner's holdings are in the program and though the
owner receives only a part of his income from the land. Conse-
quently, the subsidy is linked less to the land as an incentive to
keep it in farm use than to the individual farmer's need for income
support. 56
Another limitation on the receipt of benefits is that tax credits
are available only to owners. 57 Owners are defined in the Act as
persons having a freehold interest coupled with possession and
enjoyment. 58 Apparently, then, a lessor or lessee may not avail
himself of the program. 59
An additional benefit is partial exemption from special local as-
sessments (e.g.,for sewers).60 The land so exempted may not make
use of the improvement paid for by the special assessment until the
special assessment is paid and the Farmland Agreement is
terminated. 61
Termination of the Farmland Agreement may occur by one of
three routes. Termination in the public interest, at the request of
the state and with the agreement of the owner, occurs without
penalty. 62 Presumably, even if the owner does not agree to the
56 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.710(l)(a). It may be that the use of total household or
taxable income was meant to deter the professional speculator whose holdings will include
more than farmland. While this scheme will be effective in that respect, if the goal of the
statute is income subsidy through tax relief for farmers, this restriction is overbroad because
it will exclude many of the most needy. The farmer whose property tax is high in relation to
his farm income may be forced to take a second job because his farm is small and poor. The
second job raises total household income, thereby reducing the percentage of household
income taken by property taxes and denying the marginal farmer, who is most likely to sell,
any benefits.
51 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.710. Beneficiaries of an estate or trust, partners, and par-
ticipants in subchapter S corporations, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371 et seq., are
entitled to a proportionate share of the credit, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.710(l)(c), appar-
ently on the theory that the one who pays the tax on the farm income should get the tax
credit.
58 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.702(9).
59 Presumably the limitation is meant to avoid the abuses occurring in other states where
speculators buy land for development but, until the land fully appreciates in value, lease it to
tenant farmers whose presence may activate the subsidies and whose efforts generate
sufficient income to cover the remainder of the speculators' carrying costs. W. WHYTE,
supra note 25, at 109-10; Lockner & Kim, supra note 14, at 239. Nevertheless, it is difficult
to justify, either in terms of income subsidy or preservation of farmland, a distinction
between bona fide farmers based on the form of possession of the land.
60 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.709.
61 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.709.
62 MICH. COMp. LAWS § 554.712(2) (a), (6). The Act contains no express grant of author-
ity to any agency or officer of the state to determine the public interest, nor does it provide
any standard for the determination. Proposed Rule 554.701(9) provides that "State" means
a major State agency in agreement with the SLUA. See note 63 and notes 108-112 and
accompanying text infra, for discussion of intra- and inter-governmental conflicts.
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termination, the state power of eminent domain is unaffected.
63
State interests which would not justify taking by eminent domain,
however, must apparently yield to. the continuing validity of the
Farmland Agreement. Thus, a state determination that the land
should be privately developed in the public interest is insufficient,
without the owner's consent, to terminate the agreement and end
the tax benefit. 64
If the Farmland Agreement terminates naturally - that is, if the
term of years expires - then a lien for the last seven years' tax
benefits, without interest or penalty, attaches. 65 Prior to natural
63 The statute is unenlightening if not contradictory. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.716
requires other state agencies to inform the SLUA of activities which might jeopardize the
preservation of land contemplated by the Act. This could be construed to mean that the
SLUA is to be notified of prospective uses of the eminent domain power in order that the
SLUA could more rationally decide those cases in which it has discretion to reject an
application. Yet, the provision includes the requirement that the SLUA notify other agen-
cies of land covered by agreements or easements and states that, on the basis of such
information, the other agencies shall harmonize their projects with the purposes of the Act.
This latter requirement appears to limit the exercise of the eminent domain power to those
instances consistent with the Act. If construed to mean that the eminent domain power may
not be used against land covered by an agreement or easement, state projects, especially in
areas with high concentrations of agreement- or easement-covered land, will be severely
hampered. If eminent domain may proceed, compensation to the owner is uncertain because
the State holds the development rights and may not release them without the consent of the
owner. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.704(2), .712(2)(a), .713(2)(a), .714(2)(a). Since the gov-
ernment holds and is paying for the development rights, arguably any eminent domain
compensation representing the development right ought to go to the government, not to the
owner. To avoid this danger, the owner will almost certainly agree to terminate.
The more complicated case is where one government agency invokes the eminent domain
power and the agency charged with determining when to terminate in the public interest
refuses to do so. This may often occur in the case of a Local Easement, created and paid for
by the local government. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 554.707. Having invested in the preserva-
tion of the land as open space, the locality may not agree that the state exercise of eminent
domain is in the public interest or justifies termination. It is unclear whom the state must
compensate when it exercises eminent domain over land in which a local government holds
development rights.
A similar problem exists as to whether the owner should be required to return benefits he
received under the Act before his land was taken by eminent domain. If the holder of the
development rights refuses to make a determination that termination is in the public interest,
the provisions providing that no penalty shall accrue, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.712(6),
.713(6), and .714(6), will not apply. Since such a taking constitutes a sale known to be for a
use prohibited by the agreement or easement without the permission of the holder of the
development rights, MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.715 would seem to impose penalties upon
the owner. For a listing of other states' methods of handling analogous problems, see
Barlowe, supra note 9, at 209.
64 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554. 712(2)(a).
'5 MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 554.712(l), (7). Under MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.708, the
owner is supposed to notify the state of his future intensions two years before the natural
expiration of the agreement or easement. No penalty is provided for failure to notify the
state. Compare CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 51244 (Deering 1974), wherein contracts must be
made for a ten-year minimum term. At the end of each year, the contract is automatically
extended for another year unless the owner notifies the state of his desire to withdraw.
Consequently, the contract will not naturally terminate without at least nine years prior
notice by the owner. See Olpin, Preserving Utah's Open Space, 1973 UTAH L. REV.
164.186; Mix, Restricted Use Assessment in California: Can It Fulfill Its Objectives?,
SANTA CLARA LAW. 259 (1971).
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termination, the agreement may be terminated at the owner's re-
quest, subject to approval of the state.66 Approval of an owner's
request for termination follows the same procedure as creation of
the Farmland Agreement. 67 The nature of the administratively de-
termined criteria and the placement of the burden for termination
will have a bearing on the effect of the Act.6 8 If termination is made
so easy that the owner may withdraw from the program practically
at will, the state will lose the planning and land-preservation advan-
tages of the enforceable agreement. Furthermore, the owner will
have gained flexibility for speculative maneuvers while the state
subsidizes the carrying costs of the land for so long as the owner
desires and no longer.
Upon approval of an owner's request for termination, a lien
attaches, equal to the total amount of benefits received, com-
pounded at 6 percent interest from time conferred until paid. 69 The
lien may be discharged by re-entry into a Farmland Agreement,
but any subsequent lien may not be less than the lien discharged. 70
66 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.712(2)(b). It is not clear whether the owner may terminate
as to only part of the land covered by the agreement, and if so, how the lien recouping the
benefits conferred is to be calculated. Most other statutes are equally vague in this area. See
Barlowe, supra note 9, at 209.
67 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.712(2)(b). See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
60 Proposed Rule 554.743 requires consideration of "economic inviability" and changes
in the land or its surrounding. The Rule does not prevent approval of a termination request
for other reasons.
One set of grounds for termination has been legislatively determined. Under MICH.
Comp. LAWS § 554.711(2), the land may be released in the event of death or total, perma-
nent disability of the owner. Liens then attach as in the case of natural termination. See
discussion in note 65 and accompanying text supra.
69 MICH. CoMsP. LAWS § 554.712(4). The lien becomes payable when the land is sold or
converted to a use prohibited by the former Farmland Agreement. MICH. COMP. LAWS §
554.712(5).
70 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.712(5). It is possible that an agreement would run its course
and expire, a second Farmland Agreement would be entered into, and, during the life of the
second Farmland Agreement, the owner would request and receive permission to terminate.
The Act specifies that the lien shall be for "the total amount of the credit ... received by the
owner under MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 554.710. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.712(4). It is uncer-
tain whether this applies to the total amount derived from all Farmland Agreements under
which benefits concerning that land have ever been received or only under the Farmland
Agreement currently in effect. If only the benefits from the current Farmland Agreement are
recouped, the owner may run the course of one Farmland Agreement, receiving ten years of
benefits, enter a second Farmland Agreement, and terminate it after a short time, thereby
incurring only a minimal lien.
Therefore, it is important to analyze more closely the transition from the first Farmland
Agreement to the second. Under one interpretation, the first Farmland Agreement naturally
terminates and a lien for the last seven years of benefits attaches at once. Entry into the
second Farmland Agreement then discharges that lien. This solves the problem of minimal
penalty for quick termination of the second Farmland Agreement because the second lien
may not be less than the previously discharged lien.
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Proceeds from lien payments are to be used by the state to pur-
chase development rights on other land.7"
2. Designated Areas Easements - Much of the procedure and
effect described in the preceding section of Farmland Agreements
is equally applicable to the Designated Area Easement. Conse-
quently, this section will simply deal with the ways in which the
Designated Areas Easement differs from the Farmland Agree-
ment.
The Designated Areas Easement program is a very limited
one,7 2 applying only to historical sites, "Environmental Areas"
However, this interpretation creates difficulties in the case of the Open Space Easements
for which no lien discharge provision exists. After a natural termination of the first Open
Space Easement, a lien would attach, though the owner entered a second Open Space
Easement and though the land was never converted from open space use. Since there is no
lien discharge provision, this logic would require imposition of another, cumulative lien
upon natural termination of the second Open Space Easement and so on. Consequently,
similarly situated owners of farmland and open space who each went through, say, four
ten-year covenants with the state would have strikingly different lien liabilities upon natural
termination of the fourth covenant.
To avoid these difficulties, better interpretation would treat the transition into the second
period not as a natural termination of one agreement and entry into a second, separate
agreement, but as an extension of the original agreement for additional years. MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 554.712(1) indicates that the state shall relinquish the Farmland Agreement at the
expiration of the original agreement unless renewed. Thus, if renewed, the state does not
relinquish the first agreement and take a second one; it keeps the original which is now
enforceable for an additional number of years. This approach is especially appropriate
where the owner has performed his duty to notify the state prior to expiration of an agree-
ment of his intention to remain in the program. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 554.708. Under this
single, extended Farmland Agreement, no lien would attach until final termination. Ulti-
mately, natural termination would result in a seven-year recoupment, while requested ter-
mination would recoup "the total amout of the credit ... received by the owner," MICH.
CoMP. LAWS § 554.7 10, thus solving the problem of termination a short time into the second
period.
This latter interpretation is consistent with the goal of discouraging termination in the
middle of a contract period. The owner gets benefits for the full contract term, but, more
importantly, the state gets the full benefit of the period it contracted for. From the stand-
point of state planning and preservation of farmland, the state loses whenever termination
by request shortens the period of land use protection.
It should be noted that farmers will still have an incentive to await natural termination and
imposition of a seven-year lien followed by re-entry and discharge of the lien in order to
reduce the ultimate cumulative recoupment upon a final requested termination. But, since
this is the result in all farmland cases under the former interpretation, this second interpreta-
tion is preferable because it relieves the open space owner of the burden of additive natural
termination liens and more clearly links the farmer's remaining advantage to the lien dis-
charge provision, which only he may utilize.
"' MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.712(5). The statute does not specify which agent of the
state, if any, is to collect the liens.
72 By one estimate, it will apply to only 238 miles of river frontage, 390 miles of shoreland,
and a handful of historical sites. Ann Arbor News, May 24, 1974, at p. 8, col. 1.
Journal of Law Reform
under the Michigan Shorelands Protection Act, and land within
one-quarter mile of certain rivers under the Michigan Natural Riv-
ers Act.7 3 Application for a Designated Areas Easement follows
the same routing as that for a Farmland Agreement. 74 Application
approval differs, however, in that unlike the case of the Farmland
Agreement, there is no provision requiring the SLUA to approve
every application previously approved by the local governing body
and covering land defined in the Act as eligible. 75 However, the
SLUA has eliminated its discretion by establishing rules governing
approval and rejection, 76 which impose the same limitation as ex-
ists for Farmland Agreements.77
Administrative discretion was in any event somewhat illusory.
Each application for a Designated Areas Easement (including
those the SLUA rejects) 78 must be submitted to the legislature,
and no application is finally approved except by a resolution ap-
proved by a majority of the members elected and serving in each
house of the Legislature. 79 As a consequence of this cumbersome
procedure, a Designated Areas Easement, assuming one's land
satisfies the narrow eligibility requirements, is considerably more
difficult to obtain than is a Farmland Agreement. The difference in
procedure points up a difference in purpose. While Farmland
Agreements are available as an income subsidy without regard to
open space values involved, Designated Areas Easements are
available only upon express determination by the Legislature that a
particular piece of open space ought to be preserved.
When a Designated Areas Easement is approved, the owner
receives a tax exemption. The State Tax Commission conducts a
dual appraisal, determining the current fair market value of the
land and the fair market value of the development rights.80 The fair
73 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 554.702(8)(a). See Michigan Shorelands Protection and Man-
agement Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 281.631-.645 (Supp. 1974); Michigan Natural
River Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 281 .761-.776 (Supp. 1974).
71 See text accompanying notes 37-44 supra.
7- MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.706(1), (2).
76 MICH. Comp. LAWS §§554.705(4), .717 apply to Designated Areas Easements by
virtue of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.706(l).
77 Proposed Rule 554.733(2).
71 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.706(2). Note that in discussing otherwise identical proce-
dures, MICH. ComP. LAWS § 554.706(2)(e) refers to "each application," while MICH.
Comp. LAWS § 554.707(8), dealing with Local Easements, refers to "each approved applica-
tion." Adding the word "approved" to MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.706(2)(e) would restore
the discretion to SLUA that the other provisions imply. This is probably a drafting error,
but it may reflect a legislative judgment that the land eligible for Designated Areas Ease-
ments is of sufficient importance to the state to justify legislative review of even the applica-
tions rejected by the SLUA. Proposed Rule 554.734(9) ignores the difference in wording and
requires only the forwarding to the Legislature of applications approved by the SLUA.
79 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 554.706(2)(e).
80 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.706(2)(e).
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market value of the property as a whole less the fair market value
the land would have if it could only be used as open space yields
the value of the right to develop the land.8 1 By the terms of the
Designated Areas Easement, the state holds the development
rights, and the owner is exempted from the ad valorem tax on the
portion of the property value representing the development
rights.82 The state then compensates the local government for re-
venue lost by virtue of the exemption.8 3 In return for the benefits
conferred, the Designated Areas Easement prohibits building any
structure or making any improvement without the state's
permission.84
Termination in the public interest 85 and at natural expiration 86
occurs as with Farmland Agreements.' Termination at the request
of the owner follows the same process as the original approval,
including the need for legislative approval.88 Liens attach for the
same penalties as are imposed for the corresponding termination of
a Farmland Agreement.8 9 Unlike the Farmland Agreement, there
is no provision for discharge of the lien if a new Designated Areas
Easement is entered.9 0 Also, unlike Farmland Agreements, pay-
81 It remains to be seen whether this division of values is feasible. Many states which
assess farmland at use-value use the same technique, but farms are more easily comparable
than are open space parcels. For example, the value of farmland if restricted to farmland use
can be compared to land with similar yields in remote areas where there effectively is no
other use than farming. Open space is more difficult to compare because it produces no
income and its value depends on a multitude of more subtle aesthetic variables and often
unique characteristics.
82 MICH. ComP. LAWS § 554.706(3).
83 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.706(2)(e).
84 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.706(2).
85 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 554.713(2)(a). Even though legislative approval was required to
create the Designated Areas Easement, such approval is probably not required for termina-
tion in the public interest. The Act uses the same language, "the state determines," MICH.
Comp. LAWS § 554.713(2)(a), as is used for Farmland Agreements, MICH. COMP. LAWS §
554.712(2)(a), and, unlike terminations by request, MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 554.713(2)(b),
terminations in the public interest do not carry the express requirement that the terminations
be processed in the same manner as was the original approval. Proposed Rule 554.747(l) is
not explicit, but it appears to support this interpretation.
86 MICH. ComP. LAWS § 554.713(1).
87 See text accompanying notes 62-68 supra.
88 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.713(2)(b). See text accompanying notes 74-79 supra.
Proposed Rules 554.741 - .746.
89 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.713(4) (termination at owner's request); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 554.713(7) (natural termination); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.713(6) (termination in
the public interest). Note that the recoupment is ofad valorem taxes avoided by the owner
rather than the income tax credits provided in the case of the Farmland Agreement.90 See note 70 supra.
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ments of liens received by the state are not committed to specific
use. No reason for the distinction is stated.91
3. Local Easement - The fundamental difference between
Local Easements and Designated Areas Easements is, as the
names used in this note imply, the emphasis on the local nature of
the program. Localities may act to protect open space without
approval from the state.92
Any area in which preservation as open space would conserve
natural or scenic resources may be the subject of a Local
Easement. 93 As with the Designated Areas Easement,94 the owner
does not pay ad valorem property taxes on the portion of the value
that is attributable to the development rights. 95 Restrictions upon
the land are the same as with Designated Areas Easements.
9 6
Application begins as with Farmland Agreements and Desig-
nated Areas Easements.9 7 Unlike the other programs, no approval
beyond that of the local government is necessary. 98 Along with
local control, however, comes local cost. The statute does not
provide for state reimbursement of the benefits conferred by the
local government.9 9 The loss of revenue may be worthwhile to the
locality in terms of increased flexibility of local planning and in the
ability to control land use without public purchase of the fee.100
The bleak financial condition of many local governments, how-
ever, may limit the attractiveness of a program which decreases the
local tax base.
91 Perhaps the Legislature viewed liens capturing the Farmland Agreement income tax
credit as the receipt of new revenue (and therefore rather like a windfall which is easy to part
with for the purchase of land) while viewing the liens recapturing the amounts paid out under
Designated Areas Easements as simply a return of state funds to be placed in the treasury
like any appropriated but unexpended sum. Benefits under both programs, however, have
the identical effect of reducing funds available for other state programs, and the collection of
liens under both increases available funds.
92 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.707(5).
93 MICH. COMP LAWS § 554.702(8)(b). Idle potential farmland parcels of more than forty
acres are also expressly made eligible.
9' See text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.
9' MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.707(10).
96 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.707(5). See text accompanying note 84 supra.
91 MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 554.707(1) - (4). See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
91 MICiH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.707(5), (6). Note that some state control remains in that the
SLUA is to promulgate rules governing approval by the locality. Since the locality is not
normally reimbursed for the benefits conferred upon the owner by this program, (see note
100 and accompanying text infra), the state has no financial interest in specific applications,
and the SLUA-promulgated rules have wisely chosen not to restrict severely the localities'
ability to use their own money as they deem best. Proposed Rule 554.733(3).
99 MICH. Comp. LAWS § 554.707(10).
1"' After data from the early years of the Act's operation become available, an interesting
study might compare the long-term revenue loss with the public purchases which could have
been made with the same revenues.
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If the local government rejects an application, the owner may
appeal to the SLUA.' 01 If the SLUA approves the application, it is
submitted to the legislature for final approval as with Designated
Areas Easements. 102 If the Legislature approves an application
originally rejected by the local government, the state will reim-
burse the local government for lost revenue as with Designated
Areas Easements. 103
Idle potential farmland is classed as eligible for a Local Ease-
ment rather than for a Farmland Agreement. 10 4 Since it is expected
that Local Easements will be more difficult for an owner to obtain
than Farmland Agreements, there is further indication that the
primary purpose of the statute is neither to preserve open space
nor to assure an adequate future supply of farmland, but to sub-
sidize present farmers. Moreover, the statute may even be coun-
terproductive at the margin in terms of preserving open space.
Under the regular ad valorem property tax system, the potential
from farming may not be sufficient to induce the owner of open
space to begin farming it. If, as in the present statute, an easily
obtained subsidy for farms is added while it remains difficult to get
a subsidy for open space land, the incentive to convert from open
space to farm use is increased.
Upon termination, liens attach as with the corresponding types
of termination of Farmland Agreements and Designated Areas
Easements.10 5 Unlike Farmland Agreements, there is no provision
for discharge of the lien upon re-entry into a new Local
Easement. 106
Termination by natural expiration is the same as with Farmland
Agreements.10 7 Terminations at the request of the owner and in the
101 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.707(7), (8).
102 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.707(8). Compare id. with Designated Areas Easements,
text accompanying note 78 supra. Unlike Farmland Agreements, MICH. COMP. LAWS §
554.705(9), and Designated Areas Easements, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.706(1), no appeal
from a rejection by the SLUA is expressly provided. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
Under the Administrative Procedures Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 24.201 et. seq. (Supp.
1974), however, appeal may exist as of right for a "contested case."
103 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 554.707(8). Consequently, if the local government believes that
the state will act, it has nothing to lose and everything to gain by rejecting the application
and urging the owner to appeal. See Proposed Rule 554.723(2) for factors considered by the
SLUA to be important to successful appeal.
104 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.702(8)(b).
105 MICH. ComP. LAWS §§ 554.714(4), (6), (7). See text accompanying notes 65, 69-71
supra.
100 See note 70 supra.
107 MICH. CoMP. LAW § 554.714(l). See note 65 and accompanying text, supra.
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public interest pose a problem. The statute provides that the local
government may approve requests for termination' 0 8 and may de-
termine when to terminate in the public interest. a0 9 Normally, this
scheme makes sense because the locality is providing the tax sub-
sidy without state reimbursement; it should have control over
when it will end the subsidy. However, where the local govern-
ment rejected an application and the state subsequently approved it
on appeal, the state does fund the subsidy by reimbursing the local
government for lost revenue. Since the state thus has an invest-
ment in the land, the state rather than the locality should have
control over termination."10 Nevertheless, the statute provides no
exception to the general procedure of determination by the local
governing body.
To meet this problem, the porposed rules require the SLUA and
the legislature to approve termination in the public interest"' and
requested terminations' 1 2 where original approval came through
successful appeal of a local rejection. Thus, while a local governing
body may create any Local Easement desired, it may terminate
only those which it did create; Local Easements created by the
legislature may be terminated only by the legislature.
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PREFERENTIAL
TAX TREATMENT AS A PRESERVATION MEASURE
Michigan, like many other states enacting preferential property
tax legislation, has enacted a broad, voluntary plan.1' 3 Leaving
aside for the moment the question of overinclusion," t4 a voluntary
108 MICH. CoMP LAWS §554.714(2)(b) provides that requests for termination are to be
processed by and subject to the procedures governing creation of the Local Easement. Since
the local governing body could unilaterally create any Local Easement, presumably it could
terminate one though the particular easement were created by the legislature.
109 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.714(2)(a). Similar problems surround the use of eminent
domain. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
110 This is especially so because the locality receives the lien proceeds and the state
therefore recoups nothing upon termination. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.714(5).
111 Proposed Rule 554.747(3).
112 Proposed Rule 554.743(3).
113 Perhaps the program need not be voluntary. If a government may tax lands and use the
proceeds to buy the development rights to that very land, it should be able to achieve the
same result in a single transaction by simply restricting the land and adjusting taxes for what
would have been the purchase price of those rights. To the extent that these restrictions
constitute a taking, the tax benefits conferred may be seen as the constitutionally required
compensation. U.S. CONST. amends. V. XIV. See Note, supra note 11, at 301, for a
proposal to down-zone drastically certain lands and compensate the owners for the resulting
reduction in value.
114 If, as is suspected, the primary goal of the Act is the subsidy of active farmers rather
than preservation of open space, it is not an overinclusion to allow entry by farmers whose
land is not threatened with development.
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plan must delicately balance the need for sufficient incentives to
induce a self-interested owner to enter the program and the need to
prevent such incentives from becoming a mere windfall to the
owner without protecting the land from conversion. 115 The goal is
to structure incentives and penalties to encourage entry to and
discourage exit from the program. The Michigan Act attempts to
encourage entry by offering a tax benefit and discourage exit by
requiring an enforceable contract and by imposing termination
penalties.
The enforceable contract aspect helps to deter speculation by
reducing the number of points at which the owner may exit. At the
same time, however, an enforceable contract may deter entry by
owners of land under the greatest development pressure. For ex-
ample, a ten-year minimum contract term will deter an owner who
expects his property to be saleable in five years at a price exceed-
ing the advantages available by entering the program. Thus, except
for those owners who are truly devoted to a particular piece of land
and who will continue to farm or hold as open space the same land
(so long as they are not driven into insolvency by property taxes)
without regard to potential gain from the sale of the land, the
Michigan Act has only long-term promise.1 1 6 Land far from the
urban areas may be subjected to restrictions by owners eager to
receive present tax benefits. If this land can be locked into the
program, it may be preserved from conversion when the urban
sprawl finally reaches it.
The Michigan Act defers taxes by reducing them while land is in
the program and recouping benefits upon termination. However,
deferral of taxes (especially when coupled with partial forgiveness
as in the Michigan Act) raises the possibility of simply allowing the
financially pressed landowner to become the speculator. 1 7 For-
merly forced to sell because of an inability to meet high carrying
costs, his taxes are now deferred until he can sell for a good price,
pay the back taxes, and still realize a sizeable capital gain on the
115 A tax relief program which fails to demand some form of quid pro quo from the owner,
rather than preventing conversion, may actually increase speculation by reducing carrying
costs on the speculator's land. See W. WHYTE, supra note 25, at 102.
116 Other states' programs are similarly limited. See, e.g., Note, supra note 19, at 190;
Olpin, supra note 65, at 189.
"1 For analysis of this potential under the California system, see Mix, supra note 65, at
264-68.
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transaction. In this situation, land is not protected from conversion
to more intensive use; the only effect is to eliminate the middleman
speculator. 18
The conclusion drawn by studies of the impact of preferential
treatment in other states with programs similar to Michigan's is
that conversion of land has not been appreciably slowed and, to the
contrary, that the programs generally do no more than subsidize
the carrying costs of land speculators, be they professionals or
individual owners. 119
Given the present approach to preferential treatment, there can
be no other result. This is demonstrated below by an examination
of the possible options open to the individual owner. Aside from
the owners who will continue to hold their present land unless and un-
til they are driven to bankruptcy, most landowners may be viewed
as rational economic beings. 120 Land owned has two values:
(1) What the owner may derive from holding and using the land,
and (2) what the owner may realize by selling it. The owner's
decision to hold or sell at any given time depends on which of these
values is greater. Adding the possibility of entering the Michigan
subsidy program, the landowner now has four options, which can
be expressed as four values for each time at which a decision could
be made. These values are represented by the four cells, I, II, III,
and IV in the figure below. 121
118 See W. WHYTE, supra note 25, at 116. This in itself may be of some use to the state. If
tax deferral allows the owner to hold the land until it has fully "ripened," some of the
helter-skelter development associated with premature sale and conversion may be avoided.
119 See Sullivan, The Greening of the Taxpayer: The Relationship of Farm Zone Taxa-
tion in Oregon to Land Use, 9 WILLAMETTE L. J. 1 (1973); Note, supra note 19, at 171;
Note, supra note 11, at 295; and Henke, supra note 2, at 123-24.
120 Thus, the rational farmer "pushed" off the land by rising costs and the rational farmer
"pulled" off by large gains on the sale of the land are really equivalent. Rising costs reduce
net income, making a given capital gain look better. Rising capital gains means that the net
income must also increase or the owner will sell. To prevent conversion, the state must thus
subsidize each farm to the point where net income exceeds gain from sale, or the farmer will
convert his land to other uses. See also note 121 infra.
121 The framework presented is designed only to demonstrate the basic relationships of
the individual's four options and does not pretend to express fully all of the relevant vari-
ables. Thus, for example, the taxation differences between sale and use of the land are
omitted.
Income is used in the broad sense of all benefit received. Thus, the pleasure of living in a
rural atmosphere is a component of income. However, only income derived from the land,
not the owner's labor, is included. It is assumed that the income from his farm labor is the
same as income from that labor in non-farm work that would be done if the owner disposed
of the land and took another job. Thus, the term drops out of all equations. Income from the
present time to some future time is the same in all four cells and is also omitted.
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By taking the present value of each of the four cells for any future
time, the options may be compared to reveal that which offers the
greatest return to the owner.
While one may object that the owner may have neither the desire
nor the information to calculate his options far into the future, it is
the state, not the owner, that must make the calculations. The state
must plan now, when the owner enters the program, to structure
penalties and incentives so that later, when the owner does begin to
consider his options, the subsidies and penalties will indeed have
protected the land from conversion.
A. Implications of Tax Preferences
1. Land that would not have been converted even in the absence
of any subsidy - For some land, there is no time at which the
value in Cell II exceeds that in Cell 1; that is, at no time does the
value of sale exceed the value of retention. For example, land far
removed from development pressures may have no value for uses
more intensive than farming. Nevertheless, except where entry
into the program would result in a zero benefit, the values in Cell
III are higher than the values in Cell I at all times. Thus, the owner
of land that is economically viable in its present use and who does
not need a subsidy is given incentive (and an opportunity under the
Michigan Act) to enter the program and receive a subsidy for con-
tinuing that use.
2. Land that will be converted unless subsidized - If there are
points at which Cell II exceeds Cell I, the subsidy must be set at a
level high enough to cause Cell III to exceed Cell II; that is, the
value of the subsidy must be greater than the difference between
the unsubsidized value of retaining the land and the value of selling
it. Since in most states, including Michigan, the level of subsidy
does not depend on the difference between the values in Cell I and
Cell II, the subsidy may not close the gap. For example, the
Michigan farmer whose property taxes do not greatly exceed 7
percent of household income may not get a sufficient subsidy to
make continued farming more attractive than sale.
3. Conversion of land that has been subsidized - The owner
will enter the program, receiving a subsidy which reduces carrying
costs, and will seek to terminate at a time when the value in Cell IV
exceeds that in Cell 111.122 It does not matter whether the owner
122 The ability to terminate at other than natural expiration depends on the liberality of the
regulations to be developed by the SLUA.-See text accompanying note 68 supra. If termina-
tion is made easy, the owner gains flexibility to choose the most profitable moment for exit.
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recognized this possibility when he entered the program, so long as
he later perceives the advantage of leaving the program. In the
event of such conversion, the state subsidy has not only acted to
defer carrying costs, but, to the extent that the lien imposed is
exceeded by the accumulated benefits received, it has also
amounted to a windfall upon the owner. 123
4. Sale of land under the program vs. sale of nonsubsidized land
- Since Cell IV is simply Cell II adjusted for the effect of the
subsidy and lien, Cell IV equals Cell II when the lien recoups all of
the subsidy compounded at the appropriate rate of interest. 124
Thus, to the extent that the subsidy is not recaptured, entry to the
program followed by termination and conversion is made even
more attractive than conversion without entry into the program.
Therefore, the subsidy must be further increased because Cell III
must exceed both Cell II and Cell IV if conversion is to be
prevented. 125
The above relationships indicate that, as presently constituted,
the Michigan Act (as well as other states' provisions) subsidizes
land that is in no danger of conversion, fails to subsidize land that
will be converted unless subsidized, and further fails to prevent the
conversion of land that has been subsidized or recapture benefits
previously conferred under the program.
B. Needed Action
Unless the value in Cell I exceeds that in Cell II at all times, in
which case no-entry to the program should be allowed, incentives
should be structured to make Cell III the greatest value in order to
draw in land that would be converted in the absence of a subsidy
123 Though the land is ultimately developed, governmental planning of development may
nevertheless have been aided by the assurance that the land would not be developed while
the agreement was in force. Again, the ability of the owner to choose to terminate at other
than natural expiration is of critical importance.
"' Since the money saved in tax reductions may usually be invested at a rate greater than 6
percent, the rate at which past benefits are compounded for purposes of computing the lien
upon termination by request, there is no deterrent to exit even if all of the tax benefits
compounded at 6 percent are recouped. Effective benefits conferred will always exceed the
recoupment.
25 Increasing the Cell Ill benefits also increases the Cell IV benefits. Assume that IV
exceeds Ill by $10 and that the lien recoups seven-tenths (seven years out of a ten-year
agreement) of any new benefit conferred upon Cell IV. If the benefits to Cells Ill and IV are
increased by $10 each, the lien recoups only $7. IV still exceeds Ill by $3, and the state must
further increase benefits if Cell ItI is to become the highest value.
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and to prevent the terminations that will occur when Cell IV is the
highest value.12 6 If Cell IV is held down by increasing penalties, an
effective Cell III need only exceed Cell II by the amount of the
transaction cost of entering the program.
However, even if the lien fully recaptures the benefits conferred
and the appreciation thereon, the program will nonetheless fail
(unless the subsidy is increased) where the amount realizable from
sale is growing at a faster rate than is the capitalized net income, as
rin areas of severe development pressure. In these areas, Cell II
(which equals Cell IV with full recapture) will at some point sur-
pass Cell III. To remain effective, then, the subsidy must be raised
to increase Cell III. Assuming that tax benefits could rise as
rapidly as does the amount realizable from sale, not even the state
has the resources to subsidize all land in unprofitable use to the
extent of the difference between the value of retaining the land and
the value of selling it, especially where, as in the urban fringe, the
difference is already great and is still growing.
Since the state can not increase benefits to a level where Cell III
always exceeds Cell II, the owner will not enter the program where
the present value of some future Cell II value exceeds the value of
entering the program (Cell III) now if he has sufficient resources to
cover the carrying costs of the land until it ripens. The program
similarly fails for owners who lack the resources to hold the land
until it ripens - that is, owners who will be forced to sell because
they can not sustain the expenses of holding the land until it fully
appreciates in value. These owners will enter the program because
they can not afford to wait until the favorable sale date, but unless
Cell III is increased, they will exit through Cell IV when the Cell
II value surpasses that of Cell III. This is so because full recapture
merely reduces Cell IV to the level of Cell II. By exiting through
Cell IV, the owner has the same return and carrying costs as if he
had used Cell II, but by entering the program, those carrying costs
were deferred until the owner could cover them with the proceeds
from sale. The owner has become the speculator.
126 Discussions of preferential tax treatment programs generally include the observation
that the program must avoid deterrence to entry. The tendency is to focus on termination
penalties and to reduce them in an effort to avoid overbalancing the incentives to enter with
penalties for termination. This assumes that entry is in fact discouraged by high exit penal-
ties. To the contrary, if Cell IlI exceeds Cell 11, there is incentive to enter the program even
if penalties are so high that it is impossible for Cell IV ever to contain the highest value. By
creating the possibility that the value in Cell IV could be the highest, the state merely raises
the cost to itself of creating an effective value in Cell Ill.
Eliminating Cell IV as a possible highest value removes the possibility of state subsidy
followed by conversion to higher use. It does not, however, permanently tie an owner into
the program, since under the Michigan Act, the owner may sell without penalty if the buyer
continues the land in its approved use.
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For the owner whose land is so remote that it will not ripen for a
very long time, 127 the program can be made into an effective preser-
vation measure. This can not be done by the impossibly expensive
route of increasing benefits, but can only be done by increasing
termination penalties beyond full recapture. To succeed, the pro-
gram would, in effect, have to become a trap.
To induce entry, the value in Cell III must initially exceed that
in Cell II. If, after entry, termination penalties are structured so
that Cell IV is kept below Cell III despite increases in the sale
price of the land, conversion will be prevented. For the program to
prevent conversion, then, the penalties must be set to lock land
into the program, though this may require penalties in excess of the
benefits conferred.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Michigan Farmland and Open Space Preservation Act was
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to reduce the rate of conver-
sion of finite land resources to intensive use. To achieve this goal,
the Legislature used a system of property tax relief available
primarily to farmers and only minimally available to open space
owners. While the Act contains many gaps, most of these may be
filled by judicial and administrative interpretation.
More fundamentally, the Michigan Act, in common with the
many similar provisions in other states, fails to look sufficiently far
beyond the ready assumption that conversion can be deterred if
only the cost of continuing to hold the land is reduced. A subsidy
that is not directly linked to the gap between the value of the
continued low-intensity use and the value of sale is ineffective. The
Act subsidizes land that would not be converted even in the ab-
sence of any subsidy, fails to subsidize some land that will be
converted unless subsidized, and fails to prevent the conversion of
land that has been subsidized. Some owners might keep their land
in low-intensity use (refusing to move despite potential economic
gain from conversion) until hopelessly insolvent. Assuming that
117 That is, for owners of land which will ripen so far in the future that even though the
value in Cell 11 will someday exceed that in Cell Ill, the present value of that future Cell 11
date is less than the value of entering Cell II today.
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such owners exist, that insolvency would occur without subsidy,
and that the Michigan program provides the increment necessary
to avoid insolvency, then the program will preserve land. The
combination of these three circumstances, however, is likely to be
uncommon.
In most cases, the state subsidy is merely an increment to the
value of retaining the land in low-intensity use. The state simply
can not afford the burden of subsidizing substantial amounts of
land to the extent necessary to outweigh the gap between the
owner's value of continued low-intensity use and the owner's re-
turn from sale for conversion to a higher-intensity use. Aside from
imposing heavy termination penalties that are structured to lock
owners into the program, a tax preference program such as
Michigan's cannot save substantial areas from conversion.
Preservation of our dwindling supplies of farmland and open
spaces is a crucial goal that will not be achieved unless methods
other than the current forms of tax preferences are used. While the
Michigan Farmland and Open Space Preservation Act may be an
effective way to provide an income subsidy to farmers, it is a poor
approach to fulfilling the goal its name implies.
-Ronald Henry
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